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Abstract
We propose an opinion dynamics model in which agents gradually increase their
own self-confidence while interacting with each other. The relations between the
newly proposed model and existing works of social learning, inertial opinion dynam-
ics, Bayesian inference, and stochastic multi-armed bandits are demonstrated. We
prove the convergence of the system with the existence of a truth under fixed and
periodically changing social networks, and obtain tight convergence bounds related
to the spectral gap of the graph Laplacian and the maximum total degree central-
ity, respectively. In the case of randomly generated social networks, an almost-sure
convergence result is obtained. The dynamics of the model with multiple truths or
zero truth is also discussed.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we propose an opinion dynamics model in which agents move via con-
vex combinations of the positions of neighbors specified by a sequence of graphs. The
key feature of our model is that each agent gradually increases its self-confidence rep-
resented by its weight in the convex combination. The intuition is that by constantly
incorporating signals into its own belief, the agent becomes more and more confident
about its own opinion. The motivation and validity of such a scheme are further tes-
tified by its relations between related works including social learning [1–4], Bayesian
inference [5, 6], multi-armed bandits [7, 8], as well as opinion dynamics with stubborn
or static agents [9–11]. We first give a brief introduction of related works, followed by
formally presenting the model and its relations to the above areas. Our main results
regarding consensus and convergence rate of the model under fixed and changing social
networks are presented in Section 2 and Section 3, respectively. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
Opinion dynamics model and network-based dynamical systems have received a surge
of attention lately [12–16]. In these systems, typically, a group of agents will interact by
communicating through a sequence of graphs. The original goal of opinion dynamics is to
model the formation and propagation of opinions and knowledge in a crowd of interacting
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individuals [17, 18]. Later the model grows its popularity due to its widespread use in
economics and social sciences [11,12,14]. Opinion dynamics models are usually diffusive,
in the sense that the new opinion comes from a convex combination of the old ones [19].
Thus, in its matrix form, the dynamics of the opinions is equivalent to repeated stochastic
matrix multiplications to the opinions. We refer interested readers to [20–23] for more
detailed discussions on product of stochastic matrices and averaging processes.
The major question to ask regarding opinion dynamics systems is whether the agents
will achieve consensus, a state that all the agents share the same opinion. In fact, we will
show that, with the existence of a static agent (truth), the system achieves consensus
under mild assumptions about the network structure. For fixed graph, convergence is
achieved of polynomial order O(t−ν), where ν is the spectral gap of the graph Laplacian.
For periodically changing graphs, the system converges to consensus asymptotically of
order O(t−1/dmax), where dmax is the maximum total outdegree in a period. Both the
convergence bounds are tight. If the graphs are generated randomly, we obtain an
almost-sure convergence result. We note that related opinion dynamics systems usually
feature exponential convergence [1, 13, 23]. The slower convergence in our model origi-
nates from the increasing self-confidence: larger self-weight after repeated interactions
makes the agents reluctant to move.
1.1 The Model
The system consists of n agents represented by scalars or vectors x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t),
where t = 0, 1, 2, . . . is the time. The interactions between agents are captured by a
sequence of graphs G(0), G(1), G(2) . . . , where G(t) can be any directed graph over N ,
and self-loop is allowed. It should be noted that we do not assert constraint of how
G(t) is formed, and thus G(t) can be fixed, arbitrarily specified, randomly generated, or
even coupled with the opinions. A truth (static agent) refers to the agent which never
interacts with other agents, and thus it is stuck at its initial position eternally. Though
being interesting, it is not necessary for a truth to exist in the system; if it does, the
other mobile agents are usually referred to as the learners. We use Ni(t) to denote the
neighbor set of i at time t, and j ∈ Ni(j) if and only if edge (i, j) ∈ G(t). In this case,
i gets information from j, or equivalently, j influences i. The dynamics of the model is
written as
xi(t+ 1) =
wi(t)xi(t) +
∑
j∈Ni(t) xj(t)
wi(t) + |Ni(t)| , (1)
where the weight wi(t) is a scalar associated with agent i at time t. wi(t) is regarded as
i’s self-confidence, representing the degree of how much agent i believes in its current
opinion. In spite of various seemingly plausible ways of modeling the dynamics of the
self-confidence wi(t), we assume in each step t, wi(t) increases by the number of i’s
neighbors |Ni(t)|:
wi(t+ 1) = wi(t) + |Ni(t)|. (2)
The intuition is that after communicating with |Ni(t)| agents and obtaining |Ni(t)| sig-
nals, the amount of self-confidence should also increase in that amount. The modeling
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of the dynamics of self-confidence (2) is further justified by the relations between the
proposed model and existing works on social learning, Bayesian inference, inertial opin-
ion dynamics, and multi-armed bandits in Section 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. In the mean time,
out results regarding the proposed model in Section 2 and 3 directly apply to the above
fields.
1.2 Relation to Bayesian without Recall Social Learning
In the framework of social learning, a group of learners (mobile agents) tries to learn
the state of the world denoted by a truth (static agent) via a social network. Re-
cently, Rahimian and Jadbabaie proposed the so-called Bayesian without recall (BWR)
model [24], in which the agents are assumed to be rational and memoryless. In the BWR
model, each agent adopts an initial belief, updates the belief via Bayes’s rule based on
signals transferred from the truth or other agents, while ignoring the mechanism behind
the data generating process [25–27].
Assume the belief of agent i is Gaussian distributed N(µi(t), σ
2
i (t)), and the signal
being transferred dj(t) is noisy measurement of j’s belief dj(t) ∼ N(µj(t), σ2j (t)) + j(t),
where j(t) ∼ N(0, σ2) is independent Gaussian noise. In [24], the explicit update rule
is demonstrated as
µi(t) =
τi(t)µi(t) + τ
∑
j∈Ni(t) µj(t)
τi(t) + τ |Ni(t)| , (3)
where τi(t) := σ
−2
i (t) and τ = σ
−2 are inverse variances following update rule
τi(t+ 1) = τi(t) + τ |Ni(t)|, (4)
By taking expectations on both sides of (3), it is clear that Eµi(t) together with the
weight τi(t) follows the proposed increasing self-confidence model.
1.3 Relation to Inertial Hegselmann-Krause System
In the famous Hegselmann-Krause (HK) system, each agent moves to the mass center
of all the agents within a fixed distance R [17]. Stubborn agent in an HK system moves
toward the mass center of its neighbors by any fraction of length:
xi(t+ 1) = (1− λi(t))xi(t) + λi(t)|Ni(t)|
∑
j∈Ni(t)
xj(t). (5)
Setting this fraction to zero makes the agent static. HK systems with stubborn or static
agents attract much attention recently, for the model is more realistic and addresses
issues like symmetry breaking and non-shrinking convex hull [11, 28, 29]. The factor
(1 − λi(t)) in (5) can be regarded as the normalized self-confidence in the proposed
model. In the extreme case of static agents, the corresponding self-confidence is infinity.
We note that in [11], the inertial λi(t) is endowed with more degrees of freedom and
may follow different dynamics other than (2).
3
The self-confidence wi(t) should be distinguished from the confidence bound. The
former refers to the self-weight during the convex combination, while the latter is the
cut-off threshold of the neighbor set.
1.4 Relation to Bayesian Inference and Multi-armed Bandits
To evaluate a quantity θ by repeated taking noisy measurement d(t) = θ + (t), one
can adopt a Gaussian estimator N(µ(t), σ2(t)) and update it sequentially according to
Bayes’ rule by formula
µ(t+ 1) =
τ(t)µ(t) + τd(t)
τ(t) + τ
, (6)
where the inverse variance τ(t) = σ−2(t) and τ = σ−2. Note that Eµ(t) forms an
increasing self-confidence model of a single truth and a single learner.
The Bayesian multi-armed bandit problem considers K arms with unknown values
θ1, . . . , θK . A learner sequentially picks arms and obtains noisy feedbacks. Based on (6),
all the Eµk(t) together with the arms form an increasing self-confidence model with K
leaners and K truths. In multi-armed bandits, the goal is either to identify the best arm
arg maxµk, or to maximize the expected cumulative rewards max
∑
t≤H θk(t), which lies
on whether and how fast Eµi(t) or µi(t) converges to θk. In the language of opinion
dynamics, the problem is whether and how fast consensus can be achieved for each pair
θk and Eµk.
1.5 Dynamics in Matrix Form
Let A(t) denote the associated adjacency matrix of G(t), thus aij(t) = 1 if (i, j) ∈ G(t),
and otherwise aij(t) = 0. We use D(t) to denote the outdegree matrix of G(t): D(t)
is a diagonal matrix with its i-th diagonal element being the ourdegree of i in G(t).
The weight matrix W (t) := diag(w1(t), w2(t), . . . , wn(t)), can alternatively be defined
as W (t+ 1) = W (t) +D(t) for t ≥ 0, where W (0) is the initial self-confidence.
We use the letter without the subscript i, namely x(t), to denote the column vector
(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xn(t))
T . In this symbol system, the dynamics (1) is written as
x(t+ 1) = (W (t) +D(t))−1 (W (t) +A(t))x(t). (7)
Notice that D(t) is the outdegree matrix of A(t), then (W (t) +D(t))−1 (W (t) + A(t))
is a row-stochastic matrix. For simplicity, whenever a row i of matrix W (t) + D(t) is
zero, the dynamics (7) should be understood in the sense xi(t + 1) = xi(t), since a
zero row of matrix W (t) + D(t) means the corresponding agent never interacts with
anyone. Without loss of generality, we assume the initial self-confidence is 0 for each
agent throughout this paper. For any matrix M used in the paper, we use the small
letter with double subscripts mij to denote the (i, j)-th element of M .
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2 Truth Seeking in Fixed Social Network
In this section, we consider the increasing self-confidence model with a truth and fixed
graph G(t) = G. In this case, A(t) = A, D(t) = D, W (t) = tD, and the matrix-form
dynamics (7) becomes
x(t+ 1) = ((t+ 1)D)−1(tD +A)x(t). (8)
Notice that, unlike the DeGroot model [18], a sequence of the same graph does not
lead to repeated multiplication of the same stochastic matrix. This is because the self-
confidence of an agent will increase after it receives signals, and thus the update rule
(1) does not remain the same for different t.
Without loss of generality, we assume that agent 1 is the truth that stays at the
origin forever. Thus, a1,j = 0 for all j > 1. Notice that the value of a11 will not affect
the dynamics, hence we assume a11 = 1 for convenience. By recursively adopting (8),
we have
(t+ 1)Dx(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + tDx(t)
= Ax(t) +Ax(t− 1) + (t− 1)Dx(t− 1)
= Ax(t) + · · ·+Ax(0). (9)
Let S(t) := x(t) +x(t− 1) + · · ·+x(0), then from (9), the dynamics of S(t) is written as
S(t+ 1) =
(
I +
D−1A
t+ 1
)
S(t). (10)
By repeatedly adopting (10), we obtain a formula of x(t) as
x(t) = S(t)− S(t− 1) = (tD)−1AS(t− 1)
=
D−1A
t
t−1∏
s=1
(
I +
D−1A
s
)
x(0). (11)
Intuitively, if we replace the matrix D−1A with a real number 0 < ρ < 1, then the
product of matrices in (11) becomes
ρ
t
t−1∏
s=1
(
1 +
ρ
s
)
≤ ρ
t
exp
(
ρ
t−1∑
s=1
1
s
)
= O(tρ−1). (12)
Therefore the vanishing speed is of polynomial order O(tρ−1). Back to the dynamics
of (11), we claim that whether xi(t) vanishes (converges to the truth) depends on the
difference between 1 and the modulus of the second largest eigenvalue of D−1A, which
in fact is the spectral gap of G. Formally, we claim:
Theorem 2.1 If the graph of the system Gt = G is fixed, and each leaner has a path
to the truth in G, then the system converges to the truth in polynomial order O(t−ν),
where ν > 0 is the spectral gap of G.
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Notice that under the assumption that each learner has a path to the truth, the outdegree
of each agent is positive, and thus D is invertible.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two stages. We will first show that ν > 0, then we
will prove the convergence and estimate the convergence rate. Since D−1A is a row-
stochastic matrix, therefore 1 is its largest eigenvalue. To prove that ν > 0, it is sufficient
to prove that D−1A does not have other eigenvalues with modulus 1. By regarding the
truth and the learners as two groups, it is clear that D−1A is a block lower-triangular
matrix. We use E and B to denote the remaining matrices by removing the first row
and the first column of D and A, respectively. What is left to show is that E−1B does
not have an eigenvalue λ∗ on the unit circle in the complex plane.
Suppose otherwise E−1Bu = λ∗u for a non-zero vector u, then (λ∗E − B)u = 0.
Recall that D is the outdegree matrix of A, we have
|λ∗eii − bii| ≥ eii − bii ≥
∑
j 6=i
bij , (13)
and the second inequality is strict if i has an edge to the truth. Suppose |uk| = maxi |ui|,
then from (λ∗E −B)u = 0 we have
0 =
∣∣(λ∗eii − bii)ui −∑
j 6=i
bijuj
∣∣
≥ |λ∗eii − bii||ui| −
∑
j 6=i
|bij ||uj | ≥ 0. (14)
One conclusion from (14) is that equalities hold in (13), which means i does not have an
edge to the truth. Furthermore, (14) implies that for all bij 6= 0, |uj | = |ui| also has the
largest modulus. Therefore, by repeating the same argument of i to j, it is clear that
j, and hence any learner reachable from i in G, can not have edge to the truth. This
contradicts the assumption in Theorem 2.1 that each leaner has a path to the truth.
Therefore, |λ∗| < 1 and thus we have proved that ν > 0.
For the convergence of the system, let x˜(t) = (x2(t), . . . , xn(t))
T denote the dynamics
of the learners, then it follows the update rule:
x˜(t) =
E−1B
t
t−1∏
s=1
(
I +
E−1B
s
)
x˜(0). (15)
Now let U be an invertible matrix such that the similarity transformation U−1E−1BU
is the Jordan normal form of E−1B, then for the vanishing speed of the product of
matrices in (15), it is equivalent to estimate the vanishing speed of
Q(Λ)(t) :=
Λ
t
(
Ik×k +
Λ
t− 1
)
· · · (Ik×k + Λ) ,
where Λ is any Jordan block of matrix U−1E−1BU :
Λ = λIk×k + J, J =
(
0(k−1)×1 I(k−1)×(k−1)
0 01×(k−1)
)
, (16)
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and λ is an eigenvalue of E−1B. Since Jk−1 = 0k×k, and it commutes with multiples of
Ik×k in the definition of Q(Λ)(t) in (16), then for any λ 6= 0,
max
ij
|q(Λ)ij (t)| = O
(
|λ|
t
t−1∏
s=1
(
1 +
|λ|
s
))
= O(t|λ|−1).
Notice that U only depends on the graph G. As a result,
max
i
|xi(t)| = max
λ
O(t|λ|−1) = O(tmax |λ|−1) = O(t−ν),
which completes the proof. A prevailing assumption of the graph structure in social
learning is the network being strongly connected [1, 4], which guarantees the truth to
be reachable by each learner. We note that the reachability of truth is similar to the
definition of rooted graph in [23], in which Cao et al. carefully analyzed the convergence
of the system with fixed self-confidence.
In addition to the convergence result, we prove that the bound of convergence is
tight by constructing the following system. The initial positions x˜i(0) = 1 for i ≥ 2;
the outdegree of each learner is the same number d ≥ 1; each leaner has one edge to
the truth; and bij = 1 if and only if j = i, i + 1, . . . , i + d − 2, where the subscript is
understood modulo (n− 1). In the extreme case d = 1, B is a zero matrix. Under this
construction, E = dI(n−1)×(n−1), and E−1B is a circulant matrix whose eigenvalues are
straightforward to get: λk = (1 + ωj + · · · + ωd−2j )/d, where ωj = exp(2piij/(n − 1)) is
the (n−1)-th root of unity and i stands for the imaginary unit. It is clear to check that
|λk| ≤ 1− 1/d and thus ν = 1/d.
On the other hand, since each learner starts at the same position and talks to the
same number of learners, we have x2(t) = · · · = xn(t). In view of (11),
x2(t) =
t∏
s=1
(
1− 1
sd
)
= exp
(
t∑
s=1
log
(
1− 1
sd
))
.
From Taylor expansion, we have log(1− c) ≥ −c− c2/2 for any 0 ≤ c < 1. Therefore
x2(t) ≥ exp
(
−1
d
t∑
s=1
1
s
− 1
2d2
t∑
s=1
1
s2
)
= Ω(t−
1
d ) = Ω(t−ν).
We have proved
Proposition 2.2 For any n, there exists a graph G with spectral gap ν such that
‖x(t)‖∞ = Ω(t−ν).
3 Changing Social Netwotks
In this section, we consider the increasing self-confidence model in changing social net-
works. In order to achieve consensus, information from the truth should be well spread
to the learners. Indeed, if an agent is not able to get signals from the truth constantly,
its dynamics should eventually be free from the influence of the truth. This intuition
leads to the definition and analysis of influence indicator.
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3.1 The Influence Indicator
We use P (t) to denote the remaining matrix by removing the first row and the first
column of D−1(t)A(t). Recall that whenever dii(t) = 0, pij(t) is set to 0 for all j. Note
that P (t) is a sub-stochastic matrix since its row-sums are no greater than 1. If at time
t, agent i has an edge pointing to the truth, then dii(t) = 1+a12(t)+a13(t)+ · · ·+a1n(t).
Thus, the corresponding row-sum is strictly less than one, implying non-zero impact from
the truth. Indeed, if the row-sum is exactly 1, then the dynamics of the corresponding
agent is completely determined by only the learners. Therefore, the difference between
1 and each row-sum of P (t) is an indicator of the influence from the truth. Formally,
we define the influence indicator from time s to time t, denoted by α(t : s), as:
α(t : s) = ξ − P (t : s)ξ, (17)
where ξ is the all-one column vector. When t = s+ 1, (17) is reduced to
α(s) = ξ − P (s)ξ. (18)
Notice that α(t) = 0 indicates 1 /∈ Ni(t). By repeatedly left-multiplying P (s+ 1), P (s+
2), . . . , P (t− 1) to both sides of (18), we obtain
α(t : s) =
t−1∑
k=s
P (t : k)α(k), (19)
which builds up the relation between the single-step indicator α(k) and the multi-step
indicator α(t : s).
The dynamics of the learners x˜(t) is determined by the product of P (s) for s ≤ t:
x˜(t) = P (t : 0)x˜(0), and thus
‖x˜(t)‖∞ ≤ ‖P (t : 0)‖∞‖x˜(0)‖∞. (20)
On the other hand, taking infinity norm on both sides of (17) yields
‖P (t : s)‖∞ = 1−min
i
αi(t : s). (21)
Therefore, whether x˜ converges to the truth depends on the minimum value of the
indicator.
To estimate the indicator, notice that matrix P (t) is non-negative, thus pii(t :
k) ≥ pii(t − 1) . . . pii(k). In addition, for any learner i and time r, pii(r) = (wi(r) +
ai1(r))/wi(t+ 1) ≥ wi(r)/wi(r + 1). Therefore, for any k ≥ s,
pii(t : k) ≥
t−1∏
r=k
wii(r)
wii(r + 1)
=
wii(k)
wii(t)
≥ wii(s)
wii(t)
. (22)
Again, when wii(t) = 0, then wii(s) = 0, and (22) should be understood as the trivial
inequality pii(t : k) ≥ 0. In view of (19) , (22), and notice that the matrices and
vectors involved are all non-negative, we obtain a lower bound estimate for the indicator.
Formally, we have
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Lemma 3.1 For any t > s ≥ 0, the following inequality of the influence indicator holds:
α(t : s) ≥W−1(t)W (s)
t−1∑
k=s
α(k). (23)
The inequality (23) is element-wise. We will also use matrix inequality in the same sense
for the rest of this paper.
3.2 Periodic Graph Sequence
In this subsection, we consider the case when the graph sequence is periodic: Gt+T = Gt
for t ≥ 0, where T ≥ 1 is the period. Note that the special case T = 1 reduces to
the fixed graph scenario. We define the total outdegree of agent i in a period di :=
dii(1) + · · ·+ dii(T ), and its maximum dmax := min2≤i≤n di. Since the graph sequence is
periodic, the self-confidence wii(kT ) = kdi grows linearly. We first state our main result
in this subsection:
Theorem 3.2 If the graph sequence Gt is periodic, and each learner has at least one
edge to the truth in a period, then the system will converge to the truth in the order
O(t−1/dmax), and the bound is tight.
Proof. Since each learner has at least one edge to the truth in a period, then ai1(kT ) +
ai1(kT + 1) + · · · + ai1((k + 1)T − 1) ≥ 1 for any 2 ≤ i ≤ n, and thus each element of
the indicator α((k + 1)T : kT ) is positive. More precisely,
αi(kT + l) =
ai1(kT + l)
wii(kT + l)
≥ ai1(kT + l)
wii((k + 1)T )
=
ai1(kT + l)
(k + 1)di
,
and thus
(k+1)T−1∑
r=kT
α(r) ≥ 1
(k + 1)di
(k+1)T−1∑
r=kT
ai1(r) ≥ 1
(k + 1)di
.
Based on Lemma 3.1, for k ≥ 1:
min
2≤i≤n
αi((k + 1)T : kT ) ≥ k
(k + 1)2dmax
≥ 1
(k + 3)dmax
.
In view of the last inequality and (21),
‖P ((k + 1)T : kT )‖∞ ≤ 1− 1
(k + 3)dmax
. (24)
Now let t = rT , by the sub-multiplicativity of the matrix infinity norm,
‖P (rT : 0)‖∞ ≤
r−1∏
k=1
‖P ((k + 1)T : kT )‖∞
≤
r+2∏
k=4
(
1− 1
kdmax
)
≤ exp
(
− 1
dmax
r+2∑
k=4
1
k
)
≤ O(r− 1dmax ) = O(t− 1dmax ). (25)
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This completes the proof of convergence.
For any positive integer dmax and period T , we build a system with graph sequence
G(t) such that G(kT ) is the graph in the proof of Proposition 2.2, and G(kT + r) is an
empty graph for 1 ≤ r ≤ T − 1. Then we have
‖x(t)‖∞ = Ω((t/T )−
1
dmax ) = Ω(t−
1
dmax ),
which completes the proof. Note that dmax can be interpreted as the maximum total
degree centrality of all the learners, which indicates a slower convergence rate when
highly-important leaner exists.
3.3 Random Graph Sequence
Now we consider the scenario when the graph G(t) is randomly sampled. There are
various ways of generating a random graph, and we adopt the following scheme. In each
step, every learner randomly picks di agents as its neighbors, where 1 ≤ di ≤ n is a fixed
integer, and we define dmax = max2≤i≤n di. We will show an almost-sure convergence
result:
Theorem 3.3 Assume in each step, each learner i independently picks di agents as its
neighbors uniformly at random, then almost surely, the system converges to the truth,
and the convergence rate is polynomial in t.
Proof. Since in each step, the outdegree of agent i is the fixed number di, then the
self-confidence wii(t) = dit. In view of (21),
‖P (t)‖∞ = 1−min
i
αi(t) ≤ 1− 1
dmaxt
min
i
ai1(t). (26)
Notice that ai1(t) is a Bernoulli random variable with P[ai1(t) = 1] = di/n. Define
random process β(t) = mini ai1(t). Since ai1(t) and aj1(t) are independent for i 6= j,
then β(t) is again a Bernoulli random variable, and
q : P[β(t) = 1] = d2d3 . . . dn/nn−1.
Based on (26),
‖B(t : 0)‖∞ ≤
t∏
s=1
(
1− β(s)
sdmax
)
≤ exp
(
− 1
dmax
t∑
s=1
β(s)
s
)
.
We only need to show that, with probability one, the sum of the series β(s)/s goes to
infinity.
Let γ(s) := β(s) − Eβ(s), then Eγ(s) = 0 and var [γ(s)] = var [β(s)] = q(1 − q).
Define the random process
V (s) :=
s∑
k=1
γ(s)/s
10
and F(s) the sigma algebra generated by V (0), . . . , V (s). Then
E[Vs+1|F(s)] = Evs
s
= 0,
hence V (s) is a martingale. In addition,
EV 2s =
s∑
k=1
Ev2(s)
s2
≤
s∑
k=1
1
s2
<∞.
Therefore by Martingale convergence theorem, the random variable V∞ =: lims→∞ Vs
exists and has finite variance [30]. Now let β := Eβ(s), then almost surely
‖B(t : 0)‖∞ ≤ exp
(
− 1
dmax
t∑
s=1
β + γ(s)
s
)
≤ O(t− βdmax ),
which completes the proof.
We simulate the system with n = 20, 50, 100 agents with m = 1, 5, 10. The initial
positions of the learners are uniformly sampled in the unit interval. For each pair (n,m),
we simulate 100 independent systems and calculate the averaged error ‖x(t)‖∞. The log-
log curve of each case is demonstrated in Figure 1. It is clear that the curves eventually
become straight lines, indicating a convergence rate of polynomial order.
Figure 1: Log-log curve of ‖x(t)‖∞ and t for n = 20, 50, 100 and m = 1, 5, 10. The
curves eventually become straight lines with negative slopes.
We further use linear regression to get the slope fn,m of each curve after it becomes
steady, and obtain a rough relation: fn,m ≈ −1/n, which does not depend on m. For
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learner i, when m increases, it is more likely for the truth to be a neighbor of i, which
contributes the convergence. But in the mean time, there are more learners in the
neighbor set of i, which harms the convergence since the information from other learners
is less perfect compared to the information from the truth.
3.4 Discussions: Multiple Truths and Zero Truth
The presence of multiple truths will immediately complicates the behavior of the system.
For example, if a learner communicates with truth 1 enough times in order to be in the
vicinity of truth 1, and then starts to communicate with truth 2 and does the same, by
repeating this process, the learner will oscillate between the two truths forever. If the
system contains no truth, then the previous example could still happen: we only need to
replace each truth by two colliding agents. Nevertheless, from the proof of Theorem 2.1,
it is clear that the components of each learner that is perpendicular to S should vanish
in polynomial order, where S is the space spanned by all the truths. The dynamics in
the perpendicular space S is more involved in the graph sequence G(t). We note that
more powerful techniques are required for such general cases.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an opinion dynamics model with increasing self-confidence.
The growing confidence of an agent after it repeatedly communicates with others is
reflected in its increasing self-weight. We proved that, with fixed or periodically changing
social network and a single truth, the system achieves consensus asymptotically and a
tight convergence rate of polynomial order is obtained. If each learner randomly selects
a fixed number of neighbors, then the system is proved to converge to the truth almost
surely. We also discussed the behavior of the model when zero truth or multiple truths
are present, which requires delicate analysis in the future.
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